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FOREWORD
In this timely monograph, British authors Mr.
Keir Giles and Dr. Steve Tatham fuse key lessons
from two disparate theaters to argue persuasively
for greater education of Army personnel in human
terrain disciplines.
Dr. Tatham, an expert in strategic communications
and influence operations with extensive experience
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Mr. Giles, a long-term
scholar of Russian military and political decisionmaking processes, both contribute a wealth of accessible
examples and anecdotes to argue their case for greater
investment in human domain skills, both as an insurance against future conflict and in order to prevail in
that conflict should it be joined. Drawing on a range
of sources across social science and linguistics, they
make the crucial point that both commanders and
junior personnel must be not only prepared but also
educated to set aside their cultural, social, and even
linguistic preconceptions in order to accurately assess
the options open to an adversary.
The conclusions they draw are an important contribution to the debate on the future shape of the U.S.
Army, and in particular to the training and preparation required for Regionally Aligned Forces. The Strategic Studies Institute recommends this monograph
to planners and policymakers considering force structure and training, but also specifically to planners for
regional engagement.
			
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph offers an outline for educating
U.S. and allied service personnel in fundamental human domain skills and argues against their being
overlooked in favor of technical solutions. Experience
from Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the vital
nature of understanding human terrain, with conclusions relevant far beyond counterinsurgency operations in the Islamic world. Any situation where adversary actions are described as “irrational” demonstrates
a fundamental failure in understanding the human
dimension of the conflict. It follows that where states
and their leaders act in a manner that in the United
States is perceived as irrational, this too betrays a lack
of human knowledge. The monograph highlights specific elements of psychology, theology, anthropology,
sociology, and linguistics as key requirements for the
understanding of human terrain, which is necessary
for avoiding mirroring—projecting Western assumptions onto a non-Western actor—and therefore failing
correctly to assess the options available to that actor.
The monograph argues for stronger Red Team
input into planning and decisionmaking. These Red
Teams need to be equipped with expert levels of
knowledge of all the social sciences discussed—as
applied to their target subject—in order to provide
reliable and well-founded simulations of adversary
decision processes. But over and above this, familiarity with the same principles should be far more widespread both among junior military personnel engaged
in any kind of interaction with human allies or adversaries, and among the senior audience assimilating
Red Team input into planning.

xi

This is because this input will by its very nature
be counterintuitive for individuals not specializing in
the region concerned. Commanders will receive advice that appears to make no sense, in isolation from
their other data streams and apparently contradicting
them. The ability to assess this counterintuitive input
grounded in an alien culture and language is a key
issue of education, and requires a place in senior officer education planning. The approach could then be
exercised in downstream training and predeployment
courses.

xii

TRAINING HUMANS FOR THE
HUMAN DOMAIN INTRODUCTION
We have to think differently about how we run operations, and we have to focus them on human objectives.
Major General William C. Hix, Deputy Director,
Army Capabilities Integration Center,
1
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

“[Armed Conflict] is fundamentally a human endeavor” declares the U.S. Strategic Landpower Task
2
Force in its May 2013 White Paper. After 13 years
of bloody counterinsurgency fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, this seems a rather self-evident proposition. But it is not only U.S. strategic planners who
feel it is necessary to restate it. The United Kingdom’s
(UK) Doctrine and Concepts Development Centre
(DCDC) declared in its 2010 “Future Character of
Conflict” paper that war would continue to be:
an unpredictable and uniquely human activity in
which the adversaries’ logic would not be ‘our’ logic,
and thus ‘our’ abilities to understand the adversaries
3
would be challenging.

Why are the two statements apparently not obvious? In both reports, all becomes clear just a few
short sentences later. The U.S. Landpower Task
Force notes that conflict is not “merely a contest of
technology” while DCDC notes that:
The rapidly evolving character of operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan should not have surprised us . . . but
it appears to have been partly obscured by a wave of
RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs] -induced hubris
after the Cold War. Those conflicts are neither exact

1

models for every possible future war, but nor are they
atypical in that both have re-taught us that the enemy
4
gets a vote.

In short, both organizations are noting that we
may have been seduced into believing that advanced
battlefield technology would solve all of our problems. “What we’ve seen since the beginning of war
in Afghanistan is a revolution equal to that inspired
by the introduction of gunpowder, the machine gun
or the tank,” says Peter W. Singer, former director
of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at The Brook5
ings Institution and author of Wired For War. Elsewhere he notes: “Unmanned systems, unused and
unwanted at the beginning, are now saving the lives
6
of thousands of soldiers.” For all that this is true,
and technology is now a vital feature of warfighting,
in the 5 years after Singer made that declaration on
7
the Army Technology website, that technology did
not allow the U.S.-led coalition to prevail against the
Taliban, nor did the West’s legacy in Iraq endure as
expected in the face of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rebels. Technology, it would appear, may
not be quite as seminal to the outcome as some may
have hoped.
It is easy to see why both organizations have felt
the need to address basics. In 2003, then U.S. Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld believed that America
could rely on precision guided munitions and a light
footprint to depose Saddam Hussein from power in
Iraq. Rumsfeld wanted a clinical war that would be
swift, decisive, and cheap in both dollars and U.S.
lives. He succeeded in disposing of Saddam, but the
result is that, 11 years later, Iraq is still a deeply conflict-riven nation. So too in Afghanistan, the ruling
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Taliban was ejected quickly enough from government
by aerial bombardment and special forces operations.
Ejection, however, is not defeat, and in the nearly 13
years that followed the Taliban have most certainly
not been defeated, despite the overwhelming technological advantage of the United States and its allies.
With so much money having been spent on technol8
ogy, warfighting from the Western perspective has
evolved almost beyond recognition; at the start of
this author’s military career, many of the techniques
and technologies employed on today’s battlefield belonged firmly in the realm of science fiction. Nevertheless, numerous studies of contemporary conflict show
that the possession of overwhelming firepower, intelligence, and technology is no guarantee of military
success.
With technology has come more sophisticated intelligence gathering: there have been enhancements
throughout electronic intelligence (ELINT), geographic intelligence (GEOINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT),
cyber intelligence (CYBINT), measurement and signal
intelligence (MASINT), and more. Even the nature of
human intelligence (HUMINT) collection has been
transformed. In this context, there is a significant lag
in arguably one of the most important intelligence
streams for modern warfare—population intelligence
(POPINT).
Russian operations in Crimea in early-2014 provide a clear example of how full command of POPINT
can lead to swift and decisive strategic gains—in this
9
case, with barely a shot fired. This is in stark contrast
to the point made by numerous U.S. and allied commanders in assessments and post-operational tour reports, that deficiencies in this area lead to a failure to
leverage other intelligence inputs to actually enhance
understanding.
3

According to General Stanley McChrystal, “We
need to understand how the enemy interacts with the
10
people.” Major General Mike Flynn notes that:
Our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to
answer fundamental questions about the environment
in which we operate and the people we are trying to
11
protect and persuade.

General David Petraeus said as long ago as 2008 that:
What [we’re] dealing with is much more complex and
much more nuanced than what we were trained to do.
. . . It’s about understanding the human terrain, really
12
understanding it.

Collectively, this gap in understanding gives rise
to the entirely misplaced concept of irrationality in
adversary actions. Seemingly inexplicable events—for
example, a suicide bombing or the rejection of civilmilitary cooperation (CIMIC) projects—are too often
dismissed as irrational. This is a word that has featured extensively in reports at every level—patrol,
company, battalion, and brigade. But to simply dismiss established human behavior as irrational is to
demonstrate a significant failure in understanding the
human domain. War is a human endeavor, and humans are rational creatures, even if guided by a logic
that follows principles and assumptions different from
our own. The challenge, therefore, is to arrive at an
understanding of these principles and assumptions.
This speaks of a vital element missing from our
collective armories, despite the breathtaking pace
of innovation in human domain studies during the
post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) conflicts. Indeed an
entire new lexicon of conflict seems to have grown up,

4

together with capabilities to support it; Human Terrain Systems (HTS-U.S.); Defence Cultural Advisors
(CULADS-UK); Human Terrain Analysis (HTA);
Socio-cultural Analysis; Target Audience Analysis (TAA); “Influence”; the list is long. As Winston
Churchill never quite said, never in the field of human
conflict have so many acronyms been invented in so
few years. But after some 13 years of development of
these concepts during war in two countries, it may be
that the problem is not the existence of a specific capability, but the attention and resources, or lack of them,
devoted to it by command.
This is further evidenced by the fact that the basic
principles of understanding human terrain can hardly
be described as new. At an operator level, these principles were accessible even before the United States
engaged in its 21st century wars. As stated in one U.S.
Marine Corps analysis of Russian military campaigns
in the 1990s:
The first thing you must do—and it is priority number
one—is study the people. You must know the psychological makeup of not only the combatants you might
face but that of the local populace as well. Understand
your enemy in detail—but not only from a military
and political perspective—but also from a cultural
viewpoint. If you underestimate the importance of
13
this, you are on a road to decisive defeat.

As in all conflicts, the military has learned and
adapted relatively quickly; very often however this
adaption has been driven from the ground up. What
is required now is for policymakers, too, to properly
understand the contribution that new asymmetric
capabilities can have if they are properly resourced,
and if the tribal inclinations of more conventionally-

5

minded senior officers to focus exclusively on hard
power resources can be tempered and nuanced.
A Starting Point for Cultural Awareness.
A prevalent myth of cross-cultural misunderstanding revolves around attempts by English-speaking
car manufacturers to sell into Spanish-speaking markets. Sales of the Chevrolet Nova in Latin America
(or the Vauxhall Nova in Spain, depending on your
continent) were a dismal failure until the vehicle was
renamed. Manufacturers had not reckoned on confusion between Nova and “no va,” “doesn’t go” in
Spanish. The story is a prime example of delusion
based on incomprehension of a foreign culture—not
because it is true, but because it is so universally believed, despite not being possible (a Spanish speaker will point out that cars do not “go,” they could
instead functionar or caminar, and furthermore the
difference in stress of the two syllables of Nova/
no va prevents confusion). To drive the point home,
Vauxhall Novas were in fact manufactured in Spain.
There are other, factual, examples that make the
case equally well. The German aircraft manufacturer
Grob was bemused at its failure to penetrate the Russian market in the early-1990s, until they were finally
convinced by their local advisers that the Russian
word гроб (grob) does indeed mean “coffin.” Comic
tales of incomprehension even between notionally
similar languages like British and U.S. English are
commonplace. But even these can lead to serious consequences; as, for instance, when:
a surprise multinational nuclear weapons inspection
on a suspected nuclear facility in Iraq was fouled up
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because Americans counted the ground floor as the
first floor while Brits counted the first floor as the one
14
above the ground floor.

The point of introducing these stories is to underline the critical importance of cross-cultural awareness
in any human interaction, all the more so in a conflict
environment. Precise understanding of what you are
communicating to both ally and adversary is essential. Examples are also rife from the current context
of engagement in Afghanistan. One problem is the
absence of a directly equivalent word for the English
noun “reconciliation”—quite a key word given International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) objectives—
in the Afghan Pashto language. Interpreters have to
make a choice from different words to establish context; that choice, of course, being heavily influenced
by their own education and understanding. One of
the words they may choose is “surrender.” This will
almost always be wholly unsuitable for both sides,
but non-Pashto speaking officers may be entirely unaware of what they have just proposed through their
interpreter to the other side. Similarly, former British
Ambassador to Kabul Sherard Cowper-Coles recalls a
briefing note given to the Governor of Kandahar province in 2010. The first page of the note included a bullet
point, in English, suggesting that the Governor should
“develop a plan for Kandahar,” whereas in Pashto, it
offered him “a development plan for Kandahar.”
The final example in this series is one of direct
relevance to communicating the aims of any current or planned U.S. military presence in Islamic
nations. The phrase that comes so readily to Englishspeaking lips is “boots on the ground”—yet to some
audiences, this in itself can be offensive and convey
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hostile intent. According to Mohamed Yehia of the
BBC Arabic broadcasting service:
It’s not used in Arabic because we have a problem
with boots. Footwear in general in Islamic culture has
this negative connotation. . . . Boots are something hu15
miliating or unclean.

As all these examples illustrate, a lack of visibility
into the cultural and linguistic framework of your audience, and a consequent failure to understand the importance of the right words in context for a particular
situation, in a benign environment will be expensive,
embarrassing, or just plain confusing. In less benign
environments, and particularly in conflicts, this confusion can be dangerous. Even after the experiences of
Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. and allied military personnel still appear to need a much more detailed under16
standing of why this is.
The challenge, as forces draw down from counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, is to determine
which capabilities will endure and what is the right
resource balance to strike between a conventional
warfighting apparatus and less kinetic options. In
the current debate, as preparations for conventional
high-intensity warfare are re-emphasized, there is
danger of leaving behind valuable lessons learned
from counterinsurgency experience—despite the
fact that they reach far beyond counterinsurgency
doctrine itself.
The UK military is now grading some levels of
competency as “expert,” “practitioner,” or “familiar.”
This monograph will advance the idea that in future
operations, alongside conventional military weapon
systems, combat forces must be at a minimum “famil-

8

iar” with four “ologies” and one “istics”: Psychology;
17
Theology; Anthropology, Sociology, and Linguistics.
Levels of this kind of competency are clearly related
to the role of the individual, but this monograph will
argue that all personnel will require at least this familiarity. Some will need expert knowledge of at least
one “ology” and a language, and many more will need
practitioner status.
These apparently unconventional and asymmetric capabilities need not only to be protected, on the
grounds that mastery of the human domain of conflict
requires the involvement and understanding of actual
humans; but also expanded because, as demonstrated
by the U.S. military’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program, proper investment in these capabilities has the
potential to bring positive results in achieving U.S.
aims globally, which are out of all proportion to the expenditure required. This is a reflection of the increas18
ing importance of the so-called “Strategic Corporal.”
It is now well-understood that strategic effect can be
generated by the lowest rank on the battlefield; once
again, the Russian seizure of Crimea provides a clear
and topical example. Security camera footage of the
confrontation at the doors of the Crimean parliament
in Simferopol shows clearly how confrontation and
discussion between single individuals determined
the bloodless takeover of the building, and hence the
exclusion of parliamentarians loyal to Ukraine, and
eventually the parliament’s resulting illegal vote to
19
secede.

9

THE “OLOGIES”
Theology.
The issue of God and of religion, and what their role
should be in a military context (if, indeed, any role at
all) has proved troublesome for Western armed forces
as a whole. Of course, these forces have had chaplains
among their ranks from the earliest days of organized
armed force; but their role traditionally has been the
provision of pastoral care to soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Typically the largest denomination among these
militaries has been Christian, and thus most ministers
and pastors have been drawn from the Christian religion to meet that need. However, over the last 50
years, the cultural and religious mix of post-modern
Western societies, and the militaries drawn from
them, has changed significantly. As a result, chaplains
have been augmented in the militaries of the United
States, UK, and others by their equivalent ministers
from the Jewish, Muslim, and other faiths. In the UK,
the first Muslim “chaplain,” Imam Asim Hafiz, was
appointed by the Muslim Council of Great Britain to
the UK’s Armed Forces in 2005. Initially his role was
exactly that of his Christian colleagues—to look after
the spiritual and pastoral needs of Muslim members
of the Armed Forces. Yet, he increasingly found that
he also became a de facto fount of knowledge on Islam to soldiers of every rank, religion, and level of
seniority. Slowly his role evolved, and increasingly he
found himself deployed on operations—most notably
on an extended tour in Helmand province, Afghanistan—to assist commanders in dialog with the Afghan
community and religious leaders. Today, he has left
his original pastoral duties to others, and is serving
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as the Islamic adviser to the three Service Chiefs. This
represents a significant change in emphasis, and one
brought about by a rapidly evolving operating environment.
That this change took place in the UK Armed
Forces underlines its significance. In recent decades,
the UK military had followed the trend of officiallyencouraged secularism derived not only from a declining sense of the place and importance of religion
in public society, but also from the previous Labour
governments’ emphasis on “multi-cultural Britain.”
When former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was
interviewed about the role of religion in politics and
began to discuss his faith, he was interrupted by an
influential political adviser who declared that “we
20
[the government] don’t do God.” A senior British
cleric declared in 2014 that Britain was now a postreligious society, that Britain was not a nation of believers, and that the era of widespread worship was
21
over. The comments by the former Archbishop of
Canterbury, the leader of the Anglican Church, came
in response to a letter in a major UK newspaper from
50 prominent public figures insisting that the UK was
“a non-religious” and “plural” society and that to call
22
it Christian fostered “alienation and division.” Attitudes like this appear to be borne out in surveys of the
British Armed Forces:
analysis of new Ministry of Defence figures suggests
that atheists and agnostics could overtake Christians in the ranks of the military in just 18 years. The
number of Army, Royal Navy, and RAF personnel
declaring themselves as Christians fell by more than
10 percent in just 18 months. At the same time, the
number describing themselves as ‘secular ‘ or ‘no
23
religion’ rose by almost 9 percent.
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Yet this same military recognized the crucial role
of religion in conflict.
The U.S. forces reportedly face different challenges
and controversies in addressing the issue of religion.
In a 2013 report entitled “For God and Country,” former National Security Council member James E. Parco
suggested that a fundamentalist brand of Christianity had infused American military culture. Christian
fundamentalism, the report declared, was on the rise
within the U.S. Armed Forces, a trend evidenced by
explicitly sectarian behavior of senior military leaders.
Parco described commanders using the power of their
positions to evangelize and force a narrow sectarian
view on U.S. military institutions and service mem24
bers, with little to no accountability. Conversely,
some groups and organizations are concerned at efforts to moderate religious expression (meaning, in effect, Christianity). One such, the American Center for
Law and Justice (ACLJ), reports that:
groups are already actively engaged in filing lawsuits
against the DOD and its leaders over various concerns
about religious expression in the armed services . . .
their views on church-state separation go well beyond
what the Constitution and U.S. law require. In fact,
they endanger the very freedoms the First Amend25
ment was intended to protect.

In the U.S. context too, consideration of how to
educate military personnel in religion as an integral
element of other cultures first has to contend with
domestic controversy. But this is an essential step if
those cultures are to be successfully understood and
engaged. At a conference in September 2014, Imam
Asim Hafiz explained the difference between the West
and many of the societies to which Western militar12

ies are deployed. With significant understatement, he
told an audience of British military officers that “you
are seen as being slightly odd if you start a meeting
with a prayer, or if you declare in the office your religious faith and conviction.” He then continued:
Yet in the countries where the UK currently finds itself
deployed on operations—all Muslim— you are seen to
be odd if you do not start your day or your meetings
with a prayer.

The crucial point is that:
if you are a U.S. or British soldier in the Muslim world,
there is an absolute belief that you must be a Christian—to profess no religious conviction is beyond
26
most people’s comprehension.

In conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, in mentoring in Yemen, in Somalia, in Djibouti, and in evolving
operations against the Islamic State (IS), the absolute
centrality of religion for the population is one of the
fundamental defining features of the human domain.
Religion is thus central to contemporary operations. Wahid Feroz is an Afghan-born British-educated cultural adviser to the commander ISAF in Afghanistan. At a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) training center in Oberammergau, Germany,
he explained ways in which religious nuance could
instantly negate the effect of seemingly straightforward messaging. He explained to the NATO Senior
Information Operations course that in Afghanistan:
“we were stuck on moral messaging . . . don’t commit crime, don’t grow poppies, don’t lay IEDs [improvised explosive devices].”27 But he had to advise
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the commander of the Joint PsyOps Task Group in
Afghanistan (CJPOTF) that this messaging was likely
to fail because the appeal to morality did not, in fact,
resonate in an Islamic context. While the Quran could
establish the morality or immorality of certain behaviors—many of them deeply contradictory to Western
notions of what is moral—there is also an allowance
for pragmatism, one that allows followers to break
moral laws if they have to do so to survive.
A detailed knowledge of Islam cannot be expected of every soldier. But familiarity with the different
moral framework that it provides is essential for any
military personnel operating in an Islamic environment—as the proliferation of “green-on-blue” incidents in Afghanistan testified. Still more so, planners
and senior leaders need to have informed advice on
the religious context available to them when considering operations in parts of the world other than the
Americas and Europe. This implies a recognition that
these planners and commanders may not have all the
answers to the military problems with which they
are confronted, and that solutions may come from
unlikely quarters.
In short, our men and women do need to be armed
with a more nuanced understanding of the centrality and importance of religion and faith—both to the
populations among which operations are undertaken
and, perhaps unexpectedly, in the religious values that
those same populations will expect our troops to possess. We might call this the need for the development,
through education, of a reflexive understanding.
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Anthropology.
British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor wrote in
his 1871 book “Primitive Culture” that the full range
of learned human behavior patterns should be considered as the study of culture: “that complex whole
which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals,
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired
28
by man as a member of society.” Since Tylor’s time,
the concept of culture has become a core focus of the
study of anthropology. Since 9/11, there has been a
growing acceptance and understanding of the need
for cultural awareness and knowledge when dealing
with adversaries whose culture is entirely different.
In early stages of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, cultural awareness covered simplistic advice—
take off your shoes, don’t eat with your left hand, talk
only with men, and so on. Although this is undoubtedly knowledge that all soldiers should have when
encountering foreign customs, it is not cultural anthropology—in fact, it has not evolved far from handbooks issued to U.S. servicemen on the cultural differences they would encounter when passing through
29
the UK in 1942-45.
Instead, it is a deeper understanding of the human
domain that is vital, and in this area significant improvements were later achieved. According to Major
General Ben Freakley, Commander of Joint Task Force
76 in Afghanistan:
Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable
us to predict what the enemy and non-combatants will
do, but it will help us better understand what motivates them, what is important to the host nation in
which we serve and how we can either elicit the support of the population or at least diminish their support and aid to the enemy.30
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In a bid to understand the cultural dimension of
21st century warfare, the Foreign Military Studies
Office (FMSO), based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
began the task of establishing and deploying the Human Terrain System (HTS)—five-man teams comprised of social scientists and military personnel, who
could advise commanders at operational and tactical
levels on cultural awareness shortcomings. This was
not a new idea; in the Vietnam War the U.S. military established, together with the South Vietnamese
government, a Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support program (CORDS), designed
specifically to “win hearts and minds.” CORDS was
premised on the belief that the war would be won
(or lost) not on the battlefield, but in the struggle
for the loyalty of the people. As HTS scheme instigator Jacob Kipp observes: “While history offers
many examples of insurgencies worthy of study, the
HTS concept has been largely inspired by lessons
drawn from the U.S. experience in Vietnam.” A 2007
Department of Defense report on HTS noted:
The local population in the area of conflict—the human terrain—must be considered as a distinct and
critical element of the battlespace. Therefore, the Human Terrain Team [sic] seeks to integrate and apply
sociocultural knowledge of the indigenous population
to military operations in support of the commander’s
objectives. In the words of one HTT member, ’One
anthropologist can be much more effective than a B-2
bomber—not winning a war, but creating a peace one
31
Afghan at a time.’

By April 14, 2007, 38 HTS personnel were deployed in Iraq, distributed among five teams. Of
those, eight were social scientists, and 13 spoke
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Arabic. Their deployment was clearly popular, and
they gained involvement in a number of key issues.
While their primary task was to provide commanders with relevant socio-cultural knowledge and understanding and to provide specialists able to help
integrate that understanding into the military decisionmaking process, there was a secondary task of
key importance—the HTS teams sought to minimize
the loss of knowledge and local understanding that
occurred every time a unit rotated out of theater. The
DoD report cited earlier noted:
That soldiers on their second—or third—tours possess inestimable knowledge about the area in which
they are operating is undeniable. Yet, as currently organized, combat brigades do not possess the organic
staff capability or assets to organize this knowledge …
Therefore, it is the job of HTS to take the knowledge
these soldiers have gleaned, to examine the information already being gathered on the ground on a daily
basis, engage in original research, and consider this information in terms of broader issues from a different
perspective in order to add to the brigade commander’s situational awareness of the social, economic, political, cultural and psychological factors at work in
32
the environment.

In a similar manner to the difficulties with religion
described earlier, the HTS scheme encountered considerable criticism for entirely domestic reasons unrelated to military or strategic objectives. This came, for
example, from the American Anthropological Association, which expressed concern at the teams’ ability
to “fulfill their ethical responsibilities” as anthropologists. Indeed, criticism of the issue has formed the basis of a whole sector of academic writing, exemplified
by “The Counter, Counter-Insurgency Manual,” written by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists.
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But within a military context, the reaction was different. Colonel Martin Schweitzer, Deputy Commander for Operations of the 82nd Airborne Division, told
The New York Times that his unit’s combat operations
in Afghanistan had “been reduced by 60 percent since
the scientists arrived in February [2007],” while Colonel David Woods of the 73rd Cavalry told the paper
33
that “you have to evolve, otherwise you are useless.”
In a fascinating exchange in the journal Survival, a U.S.
Marine relayed his personal experiences of cultural
awareness from operations in Bosnia, Fallujah, and
the Horn of Africa, which were then dissected by four
anthropologists. At the crux of the Marine’s view was
that: “Anthropology and ethnography teach us to listen well, ask good questions and develop a broad yet
34
critical understanding of ethnic conflict.”
The UK response to this challenge was the formation of the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU)
in 2010, taking serving regular and reserve officers
and training them in Afghan languages and cultural
anthropology. Unfortunately, given normal British
resource constraints, the unit only ever had capacity
for a tiny number of officers—designated CULADS—
and the necessarily extensive training program, lasting over a year, meant that only a handful were able
to finally deploy to Helmand. However, the impact of
35
those that did was profound.
Captain, and later Dr., Mike Martin was one of
the graduates of that scheme. Trained in Pashtu
language and culture, he spent an extended period in the field in Helmand engaging with local
people. He concluded that, counter to the prevailing
wisdom:
the Taliban were not the ‘main drivers of violence’.
Instead, conflict was driven by Helmandi individuals,
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including local politicians and tribal chiefs, and their
personal motivations. It is therefore more of a civil war
between clans than a clash between the ‘good’ govern36
ment of Afghanistan and the ‘bad’ Taliban.

This was sufficiently contrary to the received wisdom
of the time on the nature of the conflict to show that
there had been a basic misunderstanding of human
terrain—of the people and their motivations. Speaking anonymously, an experienced U.S. Army officer
and cultural expert said, “The absence of a strategy
forced us into someone else’s civil war and only now
are we trying to figure out what it is all about. Answer—not us.” This unwelcome finding ran directly
counter to the prevailing political and strategic narrative for Allied presence in Afghanistan.
This illustrates the often-forgotten necessity for
“Red Teams,” which will provide commanders with
a view of the same situation from a foreign or enemy
perspective. This is the only reliable way of avoiding
flawed decisions through mirroring our own perceptions, preconceptions, training, education, and world
view onto an enemy for whom all of these things in
which decisionmaking is framed may be profoundly
different. But the successful adoption of this essential
advice requires an acceptance of the counterintuitive.
Commanders need to be forewarned, and accept, that
they will receive advice that may appear nonsensical, which quite possibly they will hear from nowhere else, and that a leap of faith will be required to
have confidence that this advice is grounded in solid
knowledge of the human domain in which they are
operating. This issue is one of education, and needs
to figure prominently on professional training and
senior officer education courses.
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Although both HTS and DCSU were comparative
latecomers to the Afghan battlefield, and both were
beset with difficulties—size, funding, controversy,
rear support, acceptance by operational commanders—both were tangible demonstrations of two issues. First, Western militaries, could if they wished,
adapt quickly to fill gaps in their knowledge and to be
agile in their operations. Second, both demonstrated
the centrality of people in future conflict. As demonstrated in Crimea in early-2014—and any number of
major conflicts that have involved popular or partisan resistance—that centrality is not just restricted to
counterinsurgency operations, but extends to more
conventional state on state interactions as well.
It follows that detailed understanding of foreign
cultures at all levels of seniority is an essential prerequisite for success of the U.S. Army’s regionally aligned
forces concept. Cultural awareness is fundamental to
the aspiration for these forces voiced by General Ray
Odierno, to “identify brewing conflicts before they get
out of hand . . . better understand the enemy and work
37
more effectively with the host population.” The U.S.
Armed Forces already benefit from a prototype of
these “more culturally sophisticated soldiers” in the
form of the FAO program. But the extensive education process that is required to allow FAOs to combine
their existing military skills with specific regional expertise, language competency, and political-military
awareness highlights the scale of the challenge in delivering even attenuated versions of these competen38
cies across units as a whole.
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Psychology/Sociology.
At the turn of the 20th century, a number of researchers began conducting groundbreaking experiments into human behavior and intelligence. In 1913,
Carl Jung began the development of ideas that, in time,
would become formalized as analytical psychology.
In the same year, John B. Watson published Psychology
as the Behaviorist Views It, which suggested that human
behavior could be determined from conditioned re39
sponses. In 1915, Sigmund Freud published his work
on repression, and in 1917, Robert Yerkes introduced
the first intelligence tests in the United States. In 1954,
Abraham Maslow published Motivation and Personality, describing the theory of a hierarchy of needs,
which has guided so much of this academic sector
40
ever since. In 1961, Albert Bandura conducted his
Bobo doll experiment, to determine whether children
became violent as a result of television or games, and
subsequently linked observational learning to personality development. In 1974, Stanly Milgram published
Obedience to Authority, presenting the findings of his
41
now infamous obedience experiments.
These experiments were just part of a series conducted throughout this period to consider the relationships between attitudes and behaviors. This
research would have deep resonance for contemporary military operations. One early and often-quoted
study was conducted by Richard LaPiere, wherein
he described 2 years of traveling across the United
States by car with a couple of Chinese ethnicity. During that time, they visited 251 hotels and restaurants
and were turned away only once. At the conclusion
of their travels, LaPiere posted a survey to each of
the businesses they had visited with the question,
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“Will you accept members of the Chinese race in
your establishment?” The available responses were
“Yes,” “No,” and “Depends upon the circumstances.” Of the 128 that responded, 92 percent answered
“No.” This study was seminal in establishing the gap
42
between attitudes and behaviors.
LaPiere’s findings were confirmed by those of
43
Fishbein and Azjen in 1947, and further work has
continued to this day. The unequivocal consensus of
this collected research was that attitudes are very poor
predictors of behavior. According to one influential
social psychology text: “The original thesis that attitudes determine actions was countered in the 1960s
by the antithesis that attitudes determine virtually
44
nothing.”
In recent years, that accumulated research and
wisdom has coalesced into a process of understanding
human behavior and its motivations that has direct
relevance to military operations that seek to influence
populations. Application of the principles of this research continues to provide counterintuitive but important input into resolving security problems.
The implication for military operations is greater
predictability of adversary actions. A deeper understanding of psychological and sociological principles
of determining and describing cultural differences
would be sufficient to banish the notion of irrationality from post-operational reports. By now, the principle is well-established that kinetic operations are
costly, can go wrong, and may lead to unexpected
second order consequences; whereas non-kinetic activity, particularly that anchored in human behavior, can have longer lasting and far less expensive
outcomes. But to understand what is achievable
through these operations, when, and how, takes an
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intelligent and questioning customer base. In other
words, adopting smarter human domain operations
in order to achieve greater effect for less cost once
again requires an increased level of education of relatively junior military leaders in the basic principles of
human behavior.
Linguistics.
Linguistics is the study of languages, not just the
learning of a language. It includes within it numerous other disciplines such as the theory of translation,
lexicography, and semiotics (the study of signs and
symbols associated with languages). It is a complex
subject, but its mastery opens a significant and often
underappreciated window of understanding into other nationalities, their ethnicity, lives, culture, history,
geography and—most importantly for military operations—the drivers for specific behaviors. An advanced
knowledge of principles of linguistics is not a skill required by every soldier; far from it. But ensuring that
this knowledge is available to commanders and planning staff facilitates greater and more nuanced understanding of complex military and political issues at
senior leader level.
At a simplistic level, it is self-evident that learning another language allows comprehension of what
a potential adversary is saying without the distorting effect of translation. But above and beyond this
are multiple layers of additional benefit to linguistic
knowledge. Deep knowledge of a single language
both requires and brings with it an understanding
of the culture, traditions, history, and proclivities of
the culture in question, since all of these determine
how people from that culture communicate with each
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other. For example, students of U.S. English must
have at least a basic familiarity with the principles of
baseball in order to grasp the multitude of idioms in
American usage that derive from it. Similarly, until
recently, understanding the pronouncements of a certain class of British professional would be impossible
without a solid grasp of the rules of cricket. So, too, a
deep enough understanding of the languages of potential adversaries implies that the linguist is also an
expert in the human terrain of its speakers.
This extends to embracing an entirely different
conceptual framework, based on the words that are
available to describe different concepts in different
languages. Earlier in this monograph, the example
was given of the lack of a Pashto word for the English
word “reconciliation.” Over and above the straightforward dilemma for the interpreter, this is symptomatic
of an entirely different cultural construct: the notion
of reconciliation is as exotic to Pashtunwali as many
Pashtun customs are to us. Examples can be found
from almost any language, with direct consequences
for our assessments of adversary intentions. Reporting on Russian “peacekeeping troops,” and how and
where they may be deployed, is a case in point. The
word “peacekeeping” is the standard translation for
the Russian миротворческий (mirotvorcheskiy, “peace
creating”)—but this masks the fact that “peacekeepers,” for the Russian military, are an entirely different concept to that conveyed by the English word,
45
and a greatly more assertive and violent one. What
this means is that knowledge of the target language
is indispensible for developing correct advice on adversary culture and decisionmaking and to provide
accurate assessments to commanders.
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At a still deeper level, physiological studies have
found that speaking two or more languages—and the
duality of conceptual frameworks it brings—is an asset to the wider human cognitive process. The brains
of bilingual people operate differently than those of
single language speakers, and, in addition to crosscultural skills, these differences offer several mental
benefits. Professor Boaz Keysar, professor of psychology at the University of Chicago, describes how thinking in a foreign language can enhance decisionmak46
ing. In a series of experiments, Keyser and his fellow
researchers found that using a foreign language reduces decisionmaking bias; that the “framing effect”
disappears when choices are presented in a foreign
tongue. Keysar also proved that, whereas people were
risk averse when choices were presented in their native tongue, they were not influenced by this framing
manipulation in a foreign language. In summarizing their findings, the authors proposed that these
effects arise because a foreign language provides
greater cognitive and emotional distance than a native
tongue does.
In short, knowledge of language and of the principles behind it is key to success in operations in human terrain, because linguistic constraints and possibilities determine perception, and hence prescribe
responses to external influence, including that which
the United States and allied militaries would seek to
apply. Once again, a very simplistic example is sufficient to illustrate how this translates into practice, and
one such example is available if we consider how to
say something is blue in Pashto, English, or Russian
(i.e., in ascending order of complication). In Pashto,
there is no difference between blue and green, so the
word ( شینs̱ẖīn) can mean either blue or green, depend25

ing on context. English speakers broadly agree among
themselves on the extent of the unified color blue, and
when it is not green. But Russian goes further and has
two words to denote what is perceived as two separate
colors where English speakers see only one—Russians
refer to голубой (goluboy) for pale or clear blue, and
синий (siniy) for dark or navy blue. It follows from
this simple example not only that translation and interpretation inevitably introduce dangerous simplifications to work around cognitive differences; but also
that the role of language, and furthermore linguistics, in describing and conveying human experience
is absolutely fundamental to understanding human
terrain.
CASE STUDY: GETTING IT WRONG
Intelligence is knowing a tomato is a fruit; understand47
ing is not putting it in a fruit salad.
UK Ministry of Defense,
Joint Doctrine Publication-04, Understanding
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Center

For a recent illustration of how essential this context of human experience is when predicting behaviors, we can step away from operations and review
the decision to train Libyan servicemen in the UK as
part of international post-conflict stabilization efforts
to disarm and integrate militias in Libya. The intent,
as announced by the British Government in July 2013,
was that:
UK Armed Forces are to train their Libyan counterparts in basic infantry skills and leadership in order
to help professionalise them and help them achieve
48
peace and stability across their country.
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This was an entirely reasonable aim, and the initiative
as a whole was one recommended in a previous Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph, which stated
that:
U.S. and UN expertise in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed fighters in
post-conflict situations could be of pivotal help to
Libya at this critical juncture.

Crucially, however, the monograph continued: “but
such support should be provided carefully.” In fact,
it recommended that training should be provided
not in the United States or the UK, but in other Arab
49
countries.
Almost a year later, the first contingent of Libyan
soldiers arrived at Bassingbourn in rural England,
to be trained by the Black Watch (3rd Battalion, The
50
Royal Regiment of Scotland). But in the meantime,
experts with an understanding of the cultural and
social environment from which the soldiers had been
drawn—and the one into which they were to be inserted—had warned of severe adverse consequences from
the program, including “immigration, security, and
51
reputational risks.” Other studies suggested that far
from welcoming the assistance program, the majority
of Libyans were against the plans, wishing instead to
see the training taking place not in a foreign country,
but in their own.
A failure to provide an adequate or appropriate
assessment of the cultural and human factors that
would govern the Libyan trainees’ responses to their
new surroundings led to dire consequences for residents around Bassingbourn and in the nearest major
city, Cambridge. With discipline in rapid collapse and
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trainees routinely absconding, Cambridge police reported a sudden spike in incidences of sexual assault
and rape of both men and women, eventually traced
52
to the Libyan soldiers. Meanwhile, other soldiers requested political asylum in the UK. With police and
additional British Army personnel from another Scottish unit brought in to Bassingbourn to maintain or53
der, the training program was prematurely and per54
manently canceled.
At any one time, foreign servicemen from a wide
range of nations are undergoing training or education
in the UK, generally without incident. Public assessments of why the Libyan program in particular had led
to spectacular and unmanageable failure focused on
the dislocation suffered by the soldiers in Libya during the civil war there: according to the UK’s Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS), testifying before a parliamentary
committee, “seeing their country in the state it is now
55
. . . has been quite destabilising.” This was no doubt
true, but deeper behavioral drivers could certainly
be found for the Libyan soldiers who experienced a
rapid transition from deeply conservative religious,
traditional, and cultural values and pervasive control
by an oppressive regime to the perception of a permissive environment in the West. Tellingly, one Libyan
comment on the numbers of soldiers being arrested
for theft and sexual assault was that “they [the UK instructors] didn’t tell us about British law and what’s
56
the difference between right and wrong here.”
The incident as a whole provides two essential
lessons. First, application of cultural understanding
would have prevented embarrassing failure, by either
taking steps to mitigate the likely outcomes, or avoiding holding the training program in the UK altogether
and instead siting it in an Arab country as recom-
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mended in the earlier SSI study. Second, this cultural
understanding was readily available and widespread.
In addition to the expert assessments cited earlier, reviewing informed discussions from mid-2013 on the
plans to train Libyans in the UK the following year
reveals not only unanimous condemnation of the plan
as misconceived and misguided, but also entirely accurate (and again unanimous) predictions of the specific consequences in terms of alcohol abuse, desertion,
asylum applications, theft, indiscipline, and rapes in
57
Cambridge. In short, applying cultural understanding in the manner called for in this monograph requires asking those who have that understanding; and
then listening to the answers.
Language Learning Initiatives—United States
and UK Compared.
In addition to its enviable FAO program, the U.S.
Army provides opportunities for its soldiers to learn
languages should they so desire. For example, U.S.
Army Cadet Command has run the Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) program
for some years. This takes Reserve Officer Training
Corps cadets into foreign cultures and exposes them to
other countries’ lifestyles and world perspective, with
the reasonable intention that this will assist them in
their future military roles. In the regular Army, many
key influencers such as the U.S. Army military information support operations or MISO cadre already
require a second language as mandatory for entry
and promotion. This can be a restrictive requirement.
It often surprises foreign observers that despite the
very high proportion of the U.S. population which is
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no more than two or three generations removed from
non-English-speaking immigrants, it is estimated that
only 18 percent of American citizens speak a language
other than English. According to one commentary:
We should care—a lot—about our foreign language
deficit. We need diplomats, intelligence and foreign
policy experts, politicians, military leaders, business
leaders, scientists, physicians, entrepreneurs, managers, technicians, historians, artists, and writers who
are proficient in languages other than English. And we
need them to read and speak less commonly taught
languages (for which funding has recently been cut by
the federal government) that are essential to our strategic and economic interests, such as Farsi, Bengali,
Vietnamese, Burmese and Indonesian.58

The same commentary then quoted the then U.S.
Secretary of State for Education Arne Duncan declaring that the language deficit constitutes a “threat to
59
national security.”
In Europe, it is estimated that some 54 percent of
the population speak a second language. This does
not extend to the UK, whose citizens are famous on
the continent for their resistance to engaging with foreigners in their own language. But in July 2014, it was
reported that in the UK:
From October [2014], no officer will be promoted to
a sub-unit command—effectively any rank above
captain—unless they can speak a foreign language,
preferably French or Arabic. . . . Better language skills,
defence chiefs hope, will be at the forefront of an effort
to carve a new, more nimble but sophisticated role for
Britain’s land forces.60
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The move comes as part of the British Army’s
“international defence engagement strategy,” under
which—in an initiative akin to the U.S. Regionally
Aligned Forces—individual brigades have been assigned different geographic areas of the globe to develop a deep cultural and social working knowledge.
Officers and troops in those brigades will be encouraged to participate in diplomatic missions, training
exercises, and military deployments in their assigned
regions. According to the UK Ministry of Defense
(MoD):
bilateral relationships are essential for the army’s future focus on defence engagement and from later this
year, we will be providing linguistic training to enable
all subunit commanders to demonstrate second lan61
guage skills.

Whenever a major new UK military policy is announced, a prime locus for informed comment and
criticism is the entirely unofficial “Army Rumour Service (ARRSE)” website. With due respect for operations security, this forum distils the frank and forthright views of highly experienced serving and retired
officers, soldiers, and military experts, unconstrained
by the need to follow optimistic official narratives. As
demonstrated by the example of the Libyan training
scheme cited earlier, it thus provides a reliable indicator of the likely success of any new initiative put
forward by the UK MoD, and to some extent those of
62
allied (including U.S.) militaries.
Following the languages announcement, ARRSE
lit up. Among the most repeated criticisms were
the lack of realism of the initiative due to issues
of cost and time. A typical assessment of the cost
implications was:
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I wonder if this has been thought through. To what
standard? 3333 [denoting a NATO military standard
for foreign language competency for reading/writing/
speaking and comprehension] takes up to 18 months
full-time to achieve, depending on the language. Furthermore, immersion language training is most desirable. For Arabic, that generally means a stay in Jordan
or Oman, inter alia. The cost is also astronomical. A
63
contracted-in tutor is about £50 per hour.

The issue of time available is one that will particularly concern young British officers. Competition
for promotion slots, which have always been limited,
is becoming even more challenging as the military
contracts; and unlike some U.S. services, promotion
is far from automatic. Officers’ performance reports,
vital for promotion, are most effective if they are produced by superior officers from within the subject’s
own core specialization. It follows that taking time
out from role—for instance to attend a university language course tutored by civilians—may now be seen
as career suicide even more than previously. The UK’s
MoD has yet to explain how this will be incorporated
into career development programs.
But this lack of realism in introducing the program
in the UK obscures its potential utility for a much larger military, for example, the U.S. Army. As noted in a
recent SSI monograph, the aspiration toward a much
deeper level of regional familiarity and expertise is
key to the regional alignment strategy, but depends
entirely on fostering relevant talents and regional
expertise within line units. The overall aim could be
severely compromised if it is indeed the case that “the
[U.S.] Army has no mechanism to identify relevant
regional talents or experiences such as cultural fluen64
cies, foreign contacts, or travel abroad.”
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The examples given in this monograph have focused primarily on experience from Afghanistan and
Iraq, since this is where the current techniques of understanding human terrain have been developed and
honed. But its conclusions are relevant far beyond
counterinsurgency operations in the Islamic world.
As observed earlier, to describe adversary actions
as “irrational” is to demonstrate a fundamental failure in understanding of human terrain. It follows that
where states and their leaders act in a manner which
in the United States is perceived as irrational, this, too,
betrays a lack of human knowledge. The principles described herein should be extended to consideration of
other actors who are adversarial to the United States,
and whose decisionmaking calculus sits in a different framework to our own. This includes such major
states as Russia and China.
The case of Russia is most topical because of recent Russian actions in eastern Ukraine, referred to
throughout this monograph. Long-term observers of
Russian military and political development were dismayed that, despite their informed forecasts, Russian
military exercises in 2013 and the operation to seize
Crimea in February-March 2014, nevertheless came as
an apparent surprise to the United States and other
65
countries. One cause for this appears to have been
mirroring; projecting Western assumptions onto a
non-Western actor, and therefore failing correctly to
assess the options available to that actor. It appears
that the copious expertise and experience on Russia
available to the U.S. intelligence community at an
analyst level was trumped by more senior decisions
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that “they wouldn’t do that, it doesn’t make sense!”—
based on a U.S.-centric perception of what is rational.
This is symptomatic of the thinning of expertise
covering a range of potential conventional adversaries during the focus on counterinsurgency and coun66
terterrorism since 2001. The need is clear for Red
Team input into planning and decisionmaking. These
Red Teams need to be equipped with expert levels of
knowledge of all the social sciences discussed in this
monograph—as applied to their target subject—in order to provide reliable and well-founded simulations
of adversary decision processes. But over and above
this, familiarity with the same principles should be far
more widespread, both among junior military personnel engaged in any kind of interaction with human
allies or adversaries and among the senior audience
assimilating Red Team input into planning.
As noted earlier, this is because this input, by its
very nature, will be counterintuitive for individuals
not specializing in the region concerned. Commanders will receive advice that appears to make no sense,
in isolation from their other data streams and apparently contradicting them. The ability to assess this
counterintuitive input grounded in an alien culture
and language is a key issue of education, and requires
a place in senior officer education planning. The approach could then be exercised in downstream train67
ing and pre-deployment courses.
As development of regionally aligned forces continues, the U.S. Army should consider forming closer partnerships with UK units engaged in a similar
exercise. The UK’s “Army 2020” program includes
elements very similar to the U.S. Army’s plans for
regional alignment: specifically:

34

the Adaptable Force brigades, and some Force Troops
Command brigades [will have] assigned responsibilities for world regions. This will enable brigade units to
develop understanding of the geography, culture and
68
languages of their specified region.

The accelerated timetable for this force restructuring and transition by the British Army from 2015 may
well mean that it pre-empts the United States in some
areas. As such, it may in the process provide lessons
learned that can be applied in a U.S. context—as well
as templates or ideas that can be applied to much
greater scale and effect by the U.S. Army.
But as noted earlier, for either of these forces to
achieve their aims, focused and relevant education
of the humans that man and command them—with
no detriment to their careers—is essential. In the UK
context, “every soldier involved in overseas activity . .
69
. becomes part of the Defence Engagement mission.”
The same is no less true for the United States.
All this demands greater flexibility of mind and
diversity of approach at all levels of command, which,
in turn, demands the higher level of training in operations in human terrain noted earlier, as an integral
part of junior leader education. In this respect, there is
much to be learned from the FAO program, and many
of the attitudes and approaches of FAOs should be
adopted as mainstream rather than being relegated to
the career niche that they occupy.
In effect, in FAOs, the U.S. Army and other services already possesses a highly-trained pool of cultural
advisers who can be used as a nucleus to raise the
more general level of cross-cultural human terrain
awareness. Another accelerator for this process would
be the retention of reservists with specialist knowl70
edge of the human terrain of potential adversaries.
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Specific Additional Policy Recommendations.
•	Religion has been a defining factor of the U.S.
wars since 9/11; it is likely to continue to be
one in future conflicts in the Middle East and
Africa. U.S. forces need to maintain a developed understanding of the religious context
in which they operate, including enhanced
self-awareness of the population’s perception
of them. All personnel need to be theologically aware before deployment. Further, the
role of service chaplains—especially from nonChristian faiths—deserves greater operational
focus. While pastoral care will remain the
core duty of chaplains, their knowledge and
experience should continue to be leveraged
to enhance planning for operations in human
terrain.
•	
The effectiveness of HTS/DCSU has been
greatly underestimated and clouded by controversies that had little to do with the effectiveness of the programs. These are important
roles, and they must be afforded authority and
access accordingly. Participation in these programs must not be a career inhibitor.
•	In addition to its direct operational utility, the
learning of a foreign language provides many
downstream advantages for both the individuals and their services. Foreign language
learning opportunities should be fostered
and facilitated and, once again, should not be
career inhibitors.
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The latter point illustrates a crucial issue of planning for the human domain that FAOs understand,
but that must be explained more broadly to nonspecialists at all levels of seniority. This is that there exists
no universal model of communication applicable to all
groups and cultures. All communication efforts must
be tailored to the local dynamics and with respect to
the behaviors one is seeking to change. Because audiences are multifaceted and cannot be grouped as
a population, influencing the differing component
groups of a society requires precisely targeted methods and approaches. One message—no matter how
culturally relevant—does not fit all.
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